Metaphysics and "Separatio" According to Thomas Aquinas by Wippel, John F.
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JOHN F. WIPPEL 
v>< ONSIDERABLE attention has been paid in recent years to the 
intellectual processes involved in one's explicit discovery of being, 
especially of being as real or existing, according to Thomas Aquinas. 
Inspired in large measure by the work of E. Gilson and also of J. 
Maritain, many recent commentators on Thomas have stressed the 
role of the mind's second operation, often referred to as judgment, 
when it comes to one's discovery of being as existing. Judgment, it is 
argued, is required if one is not to have an incomplete notion of being, a 
notion of being that would be reducible to the level of an essence or 
quiddity. Only judgment can assure one that one's notion of being 
embraces being as existing, an est as well as an id quod, an "is" as well 
as a "that which."1 
Some attention has also been devoted to a particular kind of 
judgment or a particular form of the intellect's second operation, 
sometimes named separatio by Thomas. Important editions of ques 
tions 5 and 6 of Thomas's commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius 
in 1948 and 1955 and the groundbreaking study by L. B. Geiger in 
1947,2 all have set the stage for further emphasis on this distinctive 
1 On this see, for instance, E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 
2d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), chap. 6, 
''Knowledge and Existence," pp. 190-215; The Christian Philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 40-45; J. Maritain, 
Existence and the Existent (New York: Pantheon, 1948), pp. 22-35; J. 
Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1963), 
pp. 45-56, 249-58; An Interpretation of Existence (Milwaukee: Bruce, 
1968), chap. 2, "Grasp of Existence," pp. 14-43; "Judgment and Truth in 
Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 22 (1970): 139-58. 2 As will be seen below, questions 5 and 6 of this commentary are the 
most important sources for any study of separatio in Thomas. For an edition 
of these questions based on Thomas's autograph see Thomas von Aquin. In 
Librum Boethii de Trinitate. Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta, ed. P. Wyser 
(Fribourg: Soci?t? Philosophique-Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1948). For a criti 
cal edition of Thomas's entire commentary on the Boethian work see Sancti 
Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, ed. B. 
Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955; reissued in 1959). For Geiger see his 
"Abstraction et S?paration d'apr?s s. Thomas In de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3," 
Revue des sciences philosophiques et th?ologiques 31 (January 1947): 3-40; 
also, his La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, 2d ed. 
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), pp. 318-21. 
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type of intellectual operation when it comes to one's discovery of being, 
or better, of that notion of being that can serve as subject of a science 
of being as being rather than a science of being as material or as 
quantified. While this new development has remained largely 
unnoticed in certain regions of Thomistic scholarship for a number of 
years, it has been pursued in depth by other writers.3 At the same 
time, investigation of the same nicely dovetails with the renewed 
emphasis on existence and on judgment as the process required to 
discover being as existing to which we have referred above. For as 
will be seen below, at least one passage in Thomas's commentary 
(question 5, article 3) reinforces the contention that one must pass 
beyond simple apprehension to the mind's second operation or to judg 
ment if one is to grasp being explicitly as existing. This particular 
point, however, is not our primary concern here. 
In this study we wish to concentrate on questions relating to 
separatio as such insofar as it is involved in one's discovery of being 
as being, that is to say, of being as presupposed for a science of 
being as being, a metaphysics. For the sake of simplicity we shall 
consider this issue in three steps: 1) an historical review of the 
textual evidence pointing to a distinctive teaching with respect to 
separatio in Thomas; 2) an effort (also historical) to determine what 
is presupposed by Aquinas for the judgment known as separatio to 
function, that is to say, the kind of knowledge presupposed for one's 
discovery of being as being; 3) a more theoretical discussion of the 
possibility of separatio without prior awareness that immaterial 
and/or divine being exists. 
I 
Questions 5 and 6 of Thomas's commentary on the De Trini 
tate of Boethius are our richest source of information with re 
3 For some of these see R. Schmidt, "L'emploi de la s?paration en 
m?taphysique," Revue philosophique de Louvain 58 (1960): 376-93. See pp. 
373-75 for earlier treatments of the same. Among these earlier treat 
ments, Schmidt rightly stresses the importance ofthat by L.-M. Regis, "Un 
livre: La philosophie de la nature. Quelques 'Apories'," Etudes et Recherches 
1 (1936): 127-56. See in particular pp. 134-38. Also, L. Sweeney, 
A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 307-329. See pp. 307-308, nn. 13, 15, 16 for 
other literature on the topic. Also, J. Owens, "Metaphysical Separation in 
Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 34 (1972): 287-306. See p. 302, n. 39 for refer 
ences to other studies of the same. Also S. Neumann, Gegenstand und 
Methode der theoretischen Wissenschaften nach Thomas von Aquin auf 
grund der Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate (M?nster: Aschen 
dorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), pp. 72-97, 145-51. 
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spect to his views on the proper division of and relationship between 
the theoretical sciences. This commentary originates from his first 
Parisian teaching period and can be dated between 1255 and 1259 
(1258-1259, according to Weisheipl).4 In any event, therefore, it is a 
relatively early work in Thomas's career. To refer to it as a "com 
mentary" is somewhat misleading, for it is far more than that. A 
few lines taken from the De Trinitate serve as the occasion for 
Thomas's deeply personal reflection on the points at issue, and in 
questions 5 and 6, for his development of his own views on the 
nature and divisions of the theoretical sciences. Even the Latin 
title found in various early catalogues of his works, Expositio in 
librum Boethii de Trinitate, only partly indicates the true nature of 
this writing.5 
Here no attempt will be made to provide a complete summary of 
questions 5 and 6 of this commentary. We shall limit ourselves 
to some brief remarks pertaining to question 5, article 1, and 
shall then move on to a consideration of question 5, article 3. 
In question 5, article 1, the issue is raised as to whether specula 
tive science is appropriately divided into three parts, natural 
philosophy, mathematics, and what Thomas there, following the text 
of Boethius, calls "divine science."6 His answer, of course, is in the 
affirmative. This is an appropriate division of speculative science. 
The criterion proposed to justify this division is of interest, for it is 
based upon the degree to which an object of theoretical science, a 
speculabile, depends on or is free from matter and motion. As 
Thomas phrases it, separation from matter and motion or connec 
tion with the same pertains to an object of theoretical science 
considered precisely as such. Therefore, theoretical sciences are 
differentiated according to the degree of freedom from matter and 
motion of their respective objects (speculabilia).7 
Thomas then goes on to apply this criterion. Some objects of 
speculation depend on matter for their very being (secundum esse) 
since they can exist only in matter. Among these he introduces a 
4 See Wyser, "Einleitung," pp. 17-18, for the 1255-1259 dating. 
For Weisheipl see his Friar Thomas d'Aquino. His Life, Thought, and 
Work (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 381 and 136-37. 5 On this see Wyser, "Einleitung," pp. 3-4. 6 Decker ed., p. 161. (All citations will be from this edition.) 7 
Ibid., p. 165. 1-15. See in particular: "Sic ergo speculabili, quod 
est obiectum scientiae speculativae, per se competit separatio a materia et 
motu vel applicatio ad ea. Et ideo secundum ordinem remotionis a materia 
et motu scientiae speculativae distinguuntur" (12-15). 
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subdivision. Some depend on matter not only for their being, but 
also in order to be understood. By these he has in mind those ob 
jects of theoretical knowledge whose definition includes sensible 
matter. Sensible matter, matter insofar as it is subject to sensible 
qualities, is necessarily involved in one's understanding of such an 
object of theoretical science. Thus flesh and bones are included in 
one's understanding of man. Physics or natural science treats of 
such objects, according to Thomas.8 
Other objects of theoretical science (speculabilia) while also de 
pending on matter for their being, do not depend on sensible matter 
in order to be understood or defined, continues Aquinas. Such is 
true of lines and numbers, in short, of the kinds of things studied by 
mathematics. Common sensible matter, that is, matter insofar as 
it can be grasped by the senses, is not included in the definition of 
mathematicals. Yet, according to Thomas, such mathematicals can 
never in fact exist apart from matter, not even apart from sensible 
matter.9 
In contrast with objects of theoretical knowledge that depend 
on matter and motion, Thomas now refers to another kind. Some ob 
jects of theoretical knowledge do not even depend upon matter for 
their being (esse). These are of two types, those that are never found 
in matter (God and angels), and those that are found in matter in 
certain cases but not in others (substance, quality, being [ens], 
potency, act, the one and the many, and things of this kind).10 Thomas 
goes on to observe that the science that treats of all of these is called 
"theology" or "divine science," also "metaphysics," and also "first 
philosophy." Without pausing here to examine in detail his three 
reasons for these three different titles, let it suffice for us to stress one 
8 Decker ed., p. 165. 16-21. On Thomas's understanding of common 
sensible matter see L.-M. R?gis, "Un livre: La philosophie de la nature," 
p. 146, and other references cited there. Thus in one passage from his 
commentary on the Metaphysics Thomas defines it as follows: "Sensibilis 
(materia) quidem est, quae concernit qualitates sensibiles, calidum et frigi 
dum, rarum et densum, et alia huiusmodi, cum qua quidem materia concreta 
sunt naturalia, sed ab ea abstrahunt mathematica" (In 8 Met., 1. 5, n. 
1760). 9 Decker ed., p. 165. 21-24. 10 
Ibid., p. 165. 24-28. "Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non 
dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive 
numquam sint in materia, sicut deus et ?ngelus, sive in quibusdam sint in 
materia et quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum 
et multa et huiusmodi. 
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point. These are three different names for one and the same science, 
that science whose subject is being as being or being in general.11 
One important point has been made with respect to our topic. 
According to Thomas there are two classes or types of speculabilia 
that do not depend on matter either to be or to be defined. God 
(and angels) constitute the first class. A whole host of what one 
might dub "metaphysicals" are listed as representative of the second, 
including, be it noted, substance and being. If, as Thomas holds 
elsewhere and as will be seen below, the subject of a science is that 
whose causes and properties one investigates in that science, and 
if as he also holds, ens commune or ens inquantum ens is the sub 
ject of metaphysics, a problem immediately arises. Must one pre 
suppose the existence of the two kinds of speculabilia that do not 
depend on matter in the order of being if one is to begin meta 
physics? In other words, will knowledge of the second type of "im 
material," the "neutrally immaterial," if one may so phrase it, be 
sufficient to begin metaphysics? Will knowledge of this kind of 
immaterial even be possible without presupposing the reality of 
the immaterial in the first or stronger and positive sense? In short, 
must one already know that positively immaterial being (God or 
angelic being) exists in order to discover beings as such or being 
as being? 
Before leaving question 5, article 1, one more point should be 
noted. The sixth objection protests that a whole should not be 
divided from its parts. But divine science seems to be a whole with 
respect to physics and mathematics. The subjects of physics and 
mathematics (changeable substance and quantity, respectively) are 
parts of being, the subject of divine science. Therefore, divine 
science should not be contradistinguished from natural science and 
mathematics.12 
Thomas begins his reply by conceding that the subjects of 
11 
Ibid., p. 166. 1-6. On Thomas's reasons for entitling this science 
"first philosophy" see our "The Title 'First Philosophy' according to Thomas 
Aquinas and his Different Justifications for the Same," Review of Meta 
physics 27 (March 1974): 585-600. On being as being or being in general as 
subject of this science see, for instance, in this same commentary on the 
De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6 (p. 171. 16-26); q. 5, a. 4 (pp. 194-95, esp., 
194. 25-26); the "prooemium" to Thomas's Commentary on the Meta 
physics, and further discussion below in the present study. 12 Decker ed., p. 162. 18-24. 
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physics and mathematics, changeable being and quantified being, 
are parts of being, and that being (ens) itself is the subject of meta 
physics. Still, he counters, it does not follow that these other sciences 
are parts of metaphysics. For each particular science treats of one 
part of being in a special way (secundum specialem modum con 
siderando, distinct from the way in which metaphysics considers 
being. Therefore, the subject of the particular science is really not a 
part of the subject of metaphysics. For it is not a part of being from 
that standpoint under which being itself is the subject of meta 
physics.13 In brief, then, metaphysics has as its subject being in 
general rather than being as restricted to the changeable or the 
quantitative. Moreover, it studies being as being rather than as 
changing or as quantified. 
Thomas's reply is of interest for our immediate purposes because 
he is here treating of the second class of things that may be said to be 
separate from matter and motion, the neutrally immaterial, repre 
sented in this instance by being. He is suggesting that even changing 
being or quantified being can be studied by our science insofar as it 
is being, that is, from the standpoint of being.14 At the same time, 
of course, this reply again gives rise to the question: Must one 
presuppose the existence of immaterial being in the positive sense 
(God and/or angels) in order to study being as being rather than 
merely as changing or as quantified? Before attempting to discern 
Thomas's answer to this question, we shall first turn to question 5, 
article 3 of this same commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate. 
In this article Thomas raises the question: Does mathematics 
treat, without matter and motion, of what exists in matter?15 He 
already has suggested in question 5, article 1 that mathematics does 
treat of such things. But in preparing to develop this position here 
13 
Ibid., p. 171. 16-24. 14 This point is important for it shows that even in the discussion of q. 5, 
a. 1 wherein Thomas has directed the reader's attention to the different 
kinds of speculabilia corresponding to the different theoretical sciences, he 
does not reduce the subject of a science to the sum-total of things considered 
therein. The subject also includes the formal perspective of that science, 
its distinctive modus considerandi. Thomas's reply to the seventh objection 
reinforces this same point (Decker ed., p. 171. 27-30). For more on his 
understanding of the subject of a science see A. Zimmerman, Ontologie oder 
Metaphysik? Die Diskussion ?ber den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. 
und H. Jahrhundert (Leiden-K?ln: E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 160-65. 15 
"Utrum mathematica consideratio sit sine motu et materia de his 
quae sunt in materia" (Decker ed., p. 179). 
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he introduces some important precisions with respect to the intellec 
tual processes involved in arriving at the distinctive subjects of each 
of the theoretical sciences. It is within this same general context 
that he presents key texts touching on separatio. 
Thomas begins by observing that one must understand how the 
intellect in this operation is able to abstract (abstrahere possit) if 
one is to throw light on this question. Taking his cue from Aristotle's 
De anima he notes that according to the Philosopher the operation of 
the intellect is twofold. There is one operation whereby it knows 
what something is, called the understanding of indivisibles (intelli 
gentia indivisibilium). There is another whereby it composes and 
divides, that is to say, by forming affirmative and negative proposi 
tions.16 Thomas then comments that these two intellectual opera 
tions correspond to two factors found in things. The first operation 
is directed toward a thing's nature, according to which it enjoys a 
certain rank, whether it be a complete thing or even an incomplete 
thing such as a part or an accident. The second operation has to do 
with a thing's esse, which results from the union of its principles in 
the case of composites, or accompanies the simple nature itself, as 
in the case of simple substances.17 Needless to say, this text, 
together with its parallels, strongly supports those who insist that 
for Thomas one must have recourse to judgment, not merely to 
simple apprehension, if one is to grasp being as existing or as real, 
or if one is to grasp existence as such.18 
16 
Ibid., pp. 181. 17-182. 5. For Aristotle see De anima 3. 6 
430a26-28. 
17 
"Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, re 
spondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum 
quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, 
ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero 
operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem r?sultat ex congregatione 
priricipiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, 
ut in substantiis simplicibus." Decker ed., p. 182. 5-12. 18 See the authors cited in n. 1 above. For a helpful survey of recent 
Thomistic discussions of judgment see A. McNicholl, "On Judging," 
Thomist 38 (October 1974): 789-824. This should be supplemented by 
recent studies by J. Owens cited above in n. 1 as well as by his "Aquinas 
on Knowing Existence," Review of Metaphysics 29 (June 1976): 670-90. 
For a rather critical evaluation of the Gilson position on this point see J. M. 
Quinn, The Thomism of Etienne Gilson: A Critical Study (Villanova, 
Pennsylvania: Villanova University Press, 1971), pp. 53-91. Quinn's 
evaluation of Gilson continues to be disputed and defended. See A. 
Maurer, review of The Thomism of Etienne Gilson: A Critical Study, by 
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So far, then, Thomas has been discussing two intellectual opera 
tions, often known as simple apprehension and judgment. While 
the first is directed towards a thing's nature or essence, the second 
has to do with its esse. Thomas had initiated this discussion by 
suggesting that one must investigate the various ways in which the 
intellect can abstract. Now, after this brief general reference to 
simple apprehension and judgment, he again turns to that issue. 
Since the truth of the intellect results from its conformity to reality, 
in its second operation (judgment) it cannot truly abstract (ab 
strahere) that which is in fact united in reality.19 This is so because 
when one abstracts according to this second operation he indicates 
that there is a corresponding separation (separatio) in reality. 
Thomas illustrates this with the case of a white man. If I say 
that he is not white, I assert that there is a separation in reality. If 
the man is indeed white, my judgment is erroneous.20 
Thomas contrasts the second operation of the intellect with the 
first on this score. According to the mind's first operation, he con 
tinues, one can indeed abstract things which are not separated in 
reality. This is true in certain cases although not in others. In 
brief, such is possible when and only when the intelligibility of that 
which is abstracted does not depend on the other thing with which 
John M. Quinn, Thomist 37 (April 1973): 389-91; L. Kennedy, review of 
The Thomism of Etienne Gilson: A Critical Study, by John M. Quinn, 
New Scholasticism 49 (Summer 1975): 369-73; John Beach, "A Rejoinder 
to Armand A. Maurer's Review of The Thomism of Etienne Gilson: A 
Critical Study by John M. Quinn," Thomist 38 (January 1974): 187-91; 
and Beach, "Another Look at the Thomism of Etienne Gilson," New 
Scholasticism 50 (Autumn 1976): 522-28. For parallel texts in Thomas see 
In 1 Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 (Mandonnet ed., 1: 489): ". . . prima 
operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius." Also, In 1 
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, sol. (Mandonnet, 1: 903): "Cum in re duo sint 
quidditas rei, et esse eius, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. 
Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum 
quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. 
Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a quo cognitionem accipit, con 
sists in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad sub 
jectum." 19 
"Et quia veritas intellectus est ex hoc quod conformatur rei, patet 
quod secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere ab 
strahere quod secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo signifi 
caretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei. . . ." (Decker ed., p. 182. 
12-15). 20 
Ibid., p. 182. 16-18. 
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it is united in reality.21 In judgment, however, one can never truth 
fully abstract that which is united in reality. 
At this point Thomas introduces a new element into his theory of 
abstraction and separation: 
Accordingly, through its various operations the intellect distinguishes 
one thing from another in different ways. Through the operation by 
which it composes and divides, it distinguishes one thing from another 
by understanding that the one does not exist in the other. Through the 
operation,however, by which it understands what a thing is, it distin 
guishes one thing from another by knowing what one is without knowing 
anything of the other, either that it is united to it or separated from it. 
So this distinction is not properly called separation (separatio), but 
only the first. It is correctly called abstraction, but only when the 
things of which one is known without the other, are one in reality (ital. 
ours).22 
Here, then, within the general context of the different ways in which 
the intellect can 
"distinguish" one thing from another, Thomas has 
differentiated between one kind of operation referred to as separatio, 
and another referred to as abstraction. Abstraction has now taken 
on a narrower meaning, being restricted to the intellect's first opera 
tion. Separatio refers to the intellect's second operation or judg 
ment, and since it is a distinguishing or dividing operation, is often 
described by commentators on Thomas as a "negative judgment." 
Thomas goes on in this same article to distinguish two further 
subdivisions of abstraction taken in this strict and narrow sense, 
corresponding to two modes of union. To union of part and whole 
there corresponds the abstraction of the whole, the abstraction of the 
universal from the particular. To union of form (the accidental form 
of quantity) and its appropriate matter there corresponds abstrac 
tion of the form. Though Thomas's development of these two types 
of abstraction is rather detailed, we shall here content ourselves 
21 
Ibid., p. 182-83. 
22 See A. Maurer, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, 3d ed. 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), p. 30. For direct 
translations, we will follow Maurer. For the Latin see the Decker ed., 
p. 183. 23-31: "Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter 
secundum diversas operationes; quia secundum operationem, qua componit 
et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non 
inesse. In operatione vero qua intelligit, quid est unumquodque, distinguit 
unum ab alio, dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo de alio, ?eque 
quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Unde ista distinctio non 
proprie habet nomen separationis, sed prima tantum. Haec autem distinctio 
recte dicitur abstractio, sed tune tantum quando ea, quorum unum sine 
altero intelligitur, sunt simul secundum rem." 
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with noting that he then correlates separatio and the two types of 
abstraction taken strictly with his threefold division of theoretical 
science. 
We conclude that there are three kinds of distinction in the opera 
tion of the intellect. There is one through the operation of the intellect 
joining and dividing which is properly called separation, and this be 
longs to divine science or metaphysics. 
There is another through the operation by which the quiddities of 
things are conceived which is the abstraction of form from sensible 
matter; and this belongs to mathematics. 
And there is a third through the same operation which is the abstrac 
tion of a universal from a particular; and this belongs to physics and 
to all the sciences in general, because science disregards accidental 
features and treats of necessary matters.23 
In short, therefore, a particular kind of judgment, a negative 
judgment or separatio is here associated with the third degree of 
theoretical science, that is to say, with metaphysics. 
In an effort to reconstruct Thomas's teaching on the discovery of 
esse, separatio, and the subject of metaphysics, it will be helpful for 
one to recall the following points. 
First of all, by way of contrast with the mind's first operation, 
simple apprehension, its second operation or judgment is said to be 
directed towards a thing's esse. Given this, there is strong reason to 
suggest that an existential judgment or a judgment of existence has 
some role to play in one's discovery of being as existing according to 
Thomas.24 
Secondly, if one or a series of individual judgments of existence is 
(are) directed to objects that have originally been grasped by the 
senses, the subject of every such judgment will be concrete, material, 
and changing, that is, the kind of thing that can be grasped by the 
senses. If one stops at this point in formulating his notion of being, he 
will hardly have arrived at a notion of being as being rather than a 
23 Maurer trans., pp. 33-34. For the Latin see the Decker ed., 
p. 186.13-21. "Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur. 
Una secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae sepa 
ratio dicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. 
Alia secundum operationem, qua formantur quiditates rerum, quae est ab 
stracts formae a materia sensibili; et haec competit mathematicae. Tertia 
secundum eandem operationem [quae est abstractio] universalis a particulari; 
et haec competit etiam physicae et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia in 
scientia praetermittitur quod per accidens est et accipitur quod per se est." 24 See n. 18 above and the references indicated therein as well as in n. 1. 
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notion of being as changing and material. Hence he will not yet be in a 
position to develop a science of being as being or being as such. He 
may have arrived at what might be termed a primitive notion of being, 
that is, being as restricted to the material and changing.25 
Thirdly, in order to overcome this restricted notion of being, 
appeal may be made to a negative judgment, or to Thomas's separatio. 
This seems to be why he asserts that separatio is characteristic of 
metaphysics, the science of being as being, while the subject-matters 
of the other theoretical sciences can be attained by some process of 
abstraction taken strictly, or simple apprehension.26 
As to identifying more precisely the role of separatio, our task 
would be considerably easier had Thomas devoted an article or ques 
tion to its function as such. Lacking this, however, we may take our 
clues from a number of explicit references to separatio in question 5, 
article 3. As has been noted, it is a judging operation whereby one dis 
tinguishes one thing from another by understanding that the one is not 
found in the other.27 In short, it is a negative judgment. Thomas also 
states that in the case of things that can exist separately, separation 
obtains rather than abstraction.28 Hence, when he speaks most pre 
cisely, he carefully distinguishes it from abstraction. Again, he 
notes that substance, the intelligible matter of quantity, can exist 
without quantity. Therefore, the consideration of substance without 
quantity belongs to the order of separation rather than to that of 
abstraction.29 It will be recalled that according to Thomas's treat 
25 For some other contemporary interpreters of Thomas who also dis 
tinguish between this "primitive" notion of being and a truly metaphysical 
notion, see H. Renard, "What is St. Thomas' Approach to Metaphysics?" 
New Scholasticism 30 (January 1956): 73; A. M. Krapiec, "Analysis forma 
tionis conceptus entis existentialiter considerati," Divus Thomas (Piac.) 33 
(July-September 1956): 341-44; G. W. Klubertanz, Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Being, 2d ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), 
pp. 45-52; R. W. Schmidt, "L'emploi de la s?paration en m?taphysique," 
Revue philosophique de Louvain 58 (1960): 377-80. 26 For helpful remarks on separation role in detaching being from lim 
ited determinations see J.-D. Robert, "La m?taphysique, science distincte de 
toute autre discipline philosophique, selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Divus 
Thomas (Piac.) 50 (1947): 216-17. 27 See q. 5, a. 3 as cited in n. 22 above. 28 Decker ed., pp. 185. 31-186. 1. "In his autem quae secundum 
esse possunt esse divisa, magis habet locum separatio quam abstractio." 29 
Ibid., p. 186. 10-12. "Substantia autem, quae est materia intel 
ligibilis quantitatis, potest esse sine quantitate; unde considerare substan 
tiam sine quantitate magis pertinet ad genus separationis quam abstrac 
tionis." 
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ment in question 5, article 1, substance and being were cited as in 
stances of that which is found in matter in certain cases but not in 
others, that is to say, of that which is negatively or neutrally im 
material rather than positively immaterial.30 Therefore, one may 
conclude that the consideration of being as such rather than as 
material or quantified pertains to separatio rather than to abstraction. 
Finally, we have seen that separatio belongs to metaphysics or to 
divine science. If one bears in mind that for Thomas metaphysics 
has as its subject being as being, that it treats of the kind of things 
that do not depend on matter either for their existence or to be 
defined, then it follows that for him separatio is the intellectual 
process whereby one attains to that particular kind of subject matter. 
To express Thomas's understanding of separatio in other terms, 
then, it is the process through which the mind explicitly acknowl 
edges and asserts that that by reason of which something is recog 
nized as being need not be identified with that by which it is recog 
nized as material being, or changing being, or being of a given kind. 
One may describe it as a negative judgment in that it denies that 
that by reason of which something is described as being is to be identi 
fied with that by reason of which it is being of a given kind, for in 
stance, material and changing being, or quantified being, or, for that 
matter, spiritual being. One may describe it as separatio because 
by reason of this judgment one distinguishes or separates that intelli 
gibility in virtue of which something is described as being from all 
lesser and more restrictive intelligibilities that indicate its kind of 
being. As a result of separatio, therefore, one asserts that in order 
for something to be or to be real, it need not be material or changing 
or quantified. Thus one asserts the negative immateriality, the 
neutral character, of being. 
If one concedes that metaphysics is indeed the science of being 
as being and that its subject is being in general rather than this or 
that particular kind of being,31 then one can understand why Thomas 
30 See p. 434 of our text above. 31 For some other texts wherein Thomas distinguishes the metaphysi 
cian's perspective, see In S Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 2: ". . . sicut 
philosophia est specialis scientia, quamvis consideret ens secundum quod est 
omnibus commune, quia specialem rationem entis consid?r?t secundum quod 
non dependet a materia et motu" (Scriptum super Sententiis, v. 3 [Paris: 
Lethielleux, 1933], pp. 886-87). In 1* Met., 1. 1, n. 530: "Dicit autem 'se 
cundum quod est ens', quia scientiae aliae, quae sunt de entibus particu 
laribus, consid?rant quidem de ente, cum omnia subiecta scientiarum sint 
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links separatio with metaphysics and contrasts it with the abstrac 
tions characteristic of the other theoretical sciences. This is why his 
distinction between abstraction in the strict sense and separatio in 
q. 5, a. 3 is so important when it comes to grounding metaphysics or 
to one's discovery of a, metaphysical notion of being. It is by appeal 
ing to this negative judgment that one frees his notion of being from the 
restrictions involved in a merely primitive notion of being. As to 
Thomas's assertion of this distinction between abstraction in the strict 
sense and separatio, it is interesting to note that he himself settled 
on it only after some false starts. Examination of the transcription of 
his autograph of this discussion shows that in an earlier version he 
used the language: "Patet quod triplex est abstractio . . ,"32 In 
the final version he clearly distinguishes between separatio and ab 
straction and reserves the name separatio for the intellect's second 
operation. It is this that he regards as proper to metaphysics. 
In order to highlight the importance of separatio for Aquinas, 
suppose, for the sake of illustration, that one were to reject this 
distinction and reduce the formation of the notion of being to a more 
refined kind of abstraction. Thus one might first abstract from the 
individuating differences between material and changing things, 
thereby ending with a general or universal concept that still included 
reference to sensible matter, e.g., man, horse, animal. One would 
then be on the level of physics or philosophy of nature. One might 
then abstract from common sensible matter as well, retaining only 
common intelligible matter or being insofar as it is quantified. One 
would now have reached the subject of mathematics. Finally, one 
might then abstract from common intelligible matter as well, thereby 
arriving at the notion of being as being. 
The difficulty with such a procedure is that being then becomes 
another abstracted notion. As such it can hardly serve as subject of a 
entia, non tarnen consid?rant ens secundum quod ens, sed secundum quod 
est huiusmodi ens, scilicet vel numerus, vel linea, vel ignis, aut aliquid huius 
modi." In 6 Met., 1. 1, n. 1147: "De quolibet enim ente inquantum est ens, 
proprium est metaphysici considerare." It pertains to metaphysics to treat 
of being in general therefore, or without restriction precisely insofar as it is 
being rather than insofar as it is being of a given kind. 32 For Decker's transcription of the same see pp. 233. 20-24: 
"Patet ergo quod triplex est abstractio, qua intellectus abstrahit. Prima 
quidem secundum operationem secundam intellectus, qua componit et di 
vidit. Et sic intellectum abstrahere nihil est aliud hoc non esse in hoc." On 
the different redactions see Geiger, "Abstraction et s?paration," pp. 
15-20. 
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science that is so universal and so transcendental that it not only 
applies to that which is insofar as it is, but even to the individual 
differences between things. If one abstracts from individual differ 
ences, from sensible matter, and from quantity in arriving at one's 
notion of being, how can one apply such an abstracted notion to 
these same individual differences, to sensible matter, and to 
quantity? Perhaps by adding something to the notion of being that 
does not fall under the same. But that could only be non-being. 
Such an abstract notion of being might be univocal, it would seem, 
but not truly analogical and not sufficiently transcendental to serve 
as subject of a science of being as being.33 Hence Thomas's earlier 
suggestion that the mind's second operation is ordered to a thing's 
esse. Reliance solely on the mind's first operation has been re 
jected by him as insufficient to grasp being as real, or as existing. 
Were one to move by simple abstraction from the primitive notion 
of being attained through judgment to a metaphysical notion of 
being, one would, presumably, abstract from existence as well as 
from individual differences, from common sensible matter, and from 
quantity. But all of these should be included under the resulting 
metaphysical notion of being.34 Hence Thomas's second appeal to 
33 In his commentary on Metaphysics 1, Thomas attributes such rea 
soning to Parmenides: "Quicquid est praeter ens, est non ens: et quicquid est 
non ens, est nihil: ergo quicquid est praeter ens est nihil. Sed ens est 
unum. Ergo quicquid est praeter unum, est nihil. In quo patet quod con 
siderabat ipsam rationem essendi quae videtur esse una, quia non potest 
intelligi quod ad rationem entis aliquid superveniat per quod diversificetur: 
quia illud quod supervenit enti, oportet esse extraneum ab ente. Quod 
autem est huiusmodi, est nihil. Unde non videtur quod possit diversificare 
ens. Sicut etiam videmus quod differentiae advenientes generi diversificant 
ipsum, quae tarnen sunt praeter substantiam eius" (1. 9, n. 138). Thomas 
comments: "Sed in hoc decipiebantur, quia utebantur ente quasi una 
ratione et una natura sicut est natura alicuius generis; hoc enim est impossi 
ble. Ens enim non est genus, sed multipliciter dicitur de diversis" (n. 
139). Were one to regard being simply as the most abstract of all notions, 
one might well encounter a problem similar to that of Parmenides. One 
would hardly have safeguarded its analogical character. See the remarks by 
Robert, "La m?taphysique, science distincte," pp. 213-15, esp. 214, 
n. p. 29. As Robert observes, the differences which contract being 
are still included within being, though in a confused way. But specific and 
individual differences are only potentially present in non-transcendental con 
cepts. Robert refers the reader to the De veritate q. 1, a. 1. 34 
Geiger's comment bears quotation: "Mais dire cela, c'est dire ?quiva 
lemment que l'?tre ne peut ?tre abstrait ? proprement parler ni de la mati?re 
ni des r?alit?s immat?rielles, puisque tout cela est de l'?tre. Finalement 
c'est donc le caract?re transcendental, et avec lui le caract?re analogique 
propre aux donn?es transcendentales qui exige le jugement de s?paration" 
(p. 28). 
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judgment, this time, to the negative judgment, separatio. As he 
himself has shown, in certain cases of abstraction one can mentally 
distinguish things that are not distinguished in reality. Not so in 
judgment, however. By appealing to a negative judgment, to sepa 
ratio, therefore, one asserts that that by reason of which something is 
recognized as being is not to be identified with that by reason of which 
it is material or quantified or of a restricted kind. In short, one 
asserts that being, in order to be such, need not be material, or 
changing, or quantified, etc. Therefore one asserts the legitimacy 
of investigating being as being rather than as changing or as 
quantified. 
The terminological differentiation between "abstraction" and 
"separation" is, perhaps, not so important. But the difference be 
tween that which is signified by the term "abstraction," the intellect's 
first operation, and that which is signified by "separation," the 
intellect's second or judging operation, is indeed crucial. If, there 
fore, at later points in his career Thomas does not always rigorously 
preserve this distinction in terminology between abstraction and 
separatio but uses abstraction more generally so as to apply to both 
ways of distinguishing, this does not imply any change in doctrine. 
For in these later texts he still distinguishes clearly between one 
operation (simple apprehension) and the other (judgment), and still 
connects the latter with metaphysics.35 
35 Thus in Summa theologiae 1, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1, he writes: "Ad primum 
ergo dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum 
compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio, 
vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicis et absolutae 
considerationis, sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando de alio. Ab 
strahere igitur per intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, 
secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed se 
cundo modo abstrahere per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum 
rem, non habet falsitatem. 
" 
After discussing the abstraction of the universal 
from the particular in the same context, and again in his reply to the second 
objection, Thomas also considers the kind of abstraction appropriate to 
mathematics, that of quantity from sensible qualities (common sensible mat 
ter). He concludes his reply to the second objection by observing: "Quaedam 
vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut 
ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi, quae etiam esse possunt 
absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis immaterialibus. Et quia Plato 
non considera vit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis [see our 
quotation above from his reply to objection 11, omnia quae diximus abstrahi 
per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem." Although he does 
not here name this kind of "abstraction" separatio there can be no doubt that 
he is referring to the intellect's judging operation (per modum compositionis 
et divisionis). Hence his doctrine has not changed. 
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II 
If the above has been an accurate interpretation of Thomas's mind 
with respect to separatio, a second historical problem remains to be 
examined. According to Aquinas, what does separatio presuppose? 
For one to judge that being, in order to be such, need not be material 
or changing, must one already know that positively immaterial 
being exists? Must one presuppose the existence of some entity such 
as the First Mover of the Physics or a spiritual soul? The majority 
of contemporary scholars who have studied Thomas's views on 
separatio have concluded that such is his view. According to many, 
Thomas grounds separatio, and therefore the very possibility of 
metaphysics, on the demonstration of the First Mover of the Physics 
(or according to some, on the demonstration of the existence of a 
spiritual soul). If immaterial being does in fact exist, it can exist. 
Therefore, one may conclude that in order for something to be 
realized as being, it need not be material. As one writer phrases it: 
"Is the existence of immaterial beings an absolute necessity for 
metaphysics? If by metaphysics we mean a science specifically differ 
ent from physics, then their existence is absolutely necessary."36 
One of the most interesting defenses of the view that separatio 
must be grounded on prior knowledge of the existence of immaterial 
being is found in Geiger's article. After strongly asserting that this 
judgment presupposes awareness that immaterial beings actually 
exist, and after singling out two texts from Thomas's commentary 
on the Metaphysics, Geiger briefly suggests that the concept of being 
itself enjoys a certain mode of being. Because its mode of being is 
immaterial, there is at least one immaterial being given with the 
concept of being initially drawn from the material world. He sug 
36 See A. Moreno, "The Nature of Metaphysics," Thomist 30 (April 
1966): 113. Although he does not emphasize the role of separatio, Vincent 
Smith is a fine illustration of those who ground the possibility of metaphysics 
on the demonstration of an immaterial and First Mover at the conclusion of 
physics. See his "Prime Mover, Physical and Metaphysical Considerations," 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 28 (1954): 
78-94; General Science of Nature (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), p. 382: "A 
Science called metaphysics now becomes possible ... we do not discover 
that there is such a subject (being as being) without our proof that there is an 
immaterial and immobile world and without proof that mobile being, hereto 
fore taken by reason as the only reality, is not truly so. While the science 
of nature and metaphysics remain distinct disciplines, metaphysics presup 
poses the science of nature as a material condition." 
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gests that this is the procedure used by Thomas to demonstrate the 
existence of the purely immaterial activity of our intellect and, 
thereby, the immateriality of the power of the intellect itself and of 
the human soul.37 
Consideration of the texts he cites leads one back to the histori 
cal issue: does Thomas himself ground separatio and the very possi 
bility of metaphysics on prior awareness that immaterial being 
exists? A first text is taken from his commentary on the Meta 
physics, book 1, lectio 12, number 181. Here Thomas reports with 
approval Aristotle's criticism of the position of the ancient philoso 
phers of nature. Thomas notes that they were mistaken in positing 
nothing but corporeal principles. Against them he observes that 
there are not only corporeal but also certain incorporeal things, as is 
evident from the De anima.38 This text is interesting for our pur 
poses, it would seem, because in denying that only physical or cor 
poreal realities exist, Aquinas does refer in passing to the De anima, 
and presumably to what he regards as a demonstration of the in 
corporeal therein. But this text of itself does not show that the 
possibility of metaphysics in general or of separatio in particular must 
be grounded on such a presupposition. Hence we find little support 
in it for Geiger's contention. 
Geiger's second text is also taken from Thomas's commentary 
on the Metaphysics, this time from book 4, lectio 5, number 593. 
There Thomas again finds Aristotle criticizing the ancient philoso 
37 
Geiger, "Abstraction et s?paration," pp. 24-25. Note his comment 
on p. 24: "Pour que l'intelligence puisse le prononcer en toute v?rit? scien 
tifique, faut-il donc qu'elle sache qu'il existe des ?tres immat?riels avant de 
commencer la m?taphysique? Sans aucun doute. Et S. Thomas le dit ex 
plicitement dans deux textes au moins ..." He then cites two texts from 
Thomas's Commentary on the Metaphysics, for which see below. For his 
argument from the immateriality of the concept of being, see the following: 
"Alors que l'objet des concepts portant sur les essences est limit? ? cette 
essence, et donc au contenu du concept?le concept de cheval n'est pas un 
cheval, mais signifie le cheval?the concept de l'?tre signifie l'?tre et est lui 
m?me de l'?tre, parce que l'?tre est transcendant ? toute cat?gorie. Le 
concept est lui-m?me un certain mode de l'?tre, et puisqu'il est immat?riel, 
c'est un certain ?tre immat?riel qui est donn? avec le concept de l'?tre tir? 
du monde mat?riel" (p. 25). 38 
"Quia in rebus non solum sunt corp?rea, sed etiam quaedam incor 
p?rea, ut patet ex libro de Anima. Sed ipsi non posuerunt principia nisi 
corp?rea ..." In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, 
ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950). Our citation of this work 
will be from this edition. 
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phers of nature, this time for having concerned themselves with ex 
amining the first principles of demonstration. This is understandable 
in light of the ancients' view that only corporeal and mobile substance 
exists. Thomas observes that because of this the philosophers of na 
ture were thought to treat of the whole of nature, and therefore of 
being as being as well as of the first principles that are considered 
together with being. This view is false, Thomas counters, because 
there is still another science that is superior to natural philosophy. 
Nature, or natural being, is only one given class (genus) within the 
totality of being. But not all being is of this type. (Here one appears 
to have an instance of separatio, the judgment that not all being is 
physical or material.) In support of this judgment, Thomas then 
appeals to the existence of an immobile being as established in 
Book 8 of the Physics. He comments that this immobile being 
is superior to and nobler than mobile being, which the physicist con 
siders. And then, in a passage which expands considerably upon the 
text of Aristotle, he writes: "And because the consideration of ens 
commune pertains to that science to which it also belongs to consider 
the first being, therefore the consideration of ens commune also be 
longs to a science different from natural philosophy." Hence it 
will pertain to that science to study such principles.39 
Geiger concludes from this text and the previous one that the 
negative judgment which grounds the immateriality of the object of 
39 See n. 593 of Thomas's commentary. Note in particular: "Hoc 
autem falsum est; quia adhuc est quaedam scientia superior naturali: ipsa 
enim natura, idest res naturalis habens in se principium motus, in se ipsa 
est unum aliquod genus entis universalis. Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi; 
cum probatum sit in octavo Physicorum esse aliquod ens immobile. Hoc 
autem ens immobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo consid?r?t 
naturalis. Et quia ad illam scientiam pertinet consideratio entis communis, 
ad quam pertinet consideratio entis primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam quam ad 
naturalem pertinet consideratio entis communis." Although it cannot be as 
sumed that the Latin text of the Metaphysics printed with Thomas's com 
mentary is always identical with the version on which he commented, we will 
cite it and then the corresponding Greek text in order to facilitate comparison 
between Aristotle's statement and Thomas's expanded affirmation of identi 
fication of the science of the first being and the science of ens commune: 
"Sed quoniam est adhuc physico aliquis superior, unum enim aliquod genus 
est natura entis, ipsius universalis et circa substantiam primam theorizantis, 
et de his erit perscrutatio" (n. 323, p. 163); knel d'eaTLv etl tov 
<?>vctlkov rt? ?vcuT?po) (ev y?p tl y?vo? tov ?vto? i) 4>vcrt?), tov 
KaO?Kov Ka? tov irep? tt)v ttp?)tt)v ovcr?av Oe prjTiKov Kai i) irep? 
tovtc?v ?v er] cr/c i//t? (1005a33-1005bl). 
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metaphysics draws its objective value from the demonstration of im 
material beings effected in the philosophy of nature: the First Mover 
of Physics 8, and the human soul with its agent and possible 
intellect as established in the De anima. For Geiger this is only 
to be expected, since Thomas also affirms on other occasions that 
metaphysics should be taught after physics.40 
As regards the text from Thomas's commentary on Metaphysics 
Jf, one might contend that he here justifies separatio by appealing to 
the fact that immobile being exists, something that he takes Physics 
8 to have established. Moreover, he justifies the existence of the 
science of ens commune by asserting that it belongs to one and the 
same science to study the first being and to study ens commune. 
Hence he seems to justify separatio, the science of the first being, 
and the science of ens commune, by appealing to the existence of the 
immobile and first mover demonstrated in the Physics. 
However, this passage of itself does not appear to be conclusive 
proof that in Thomas's eyes one must ground metaphysics and 
separatio on the conclusions of the Physics. The situation is dia 
lectical. Thomas is commenting on Aristotle's criticism of the earlier 
natural philosophers and their restriction of reality to the material. 
Against this it would only be natural for him to cite a counterfact, 
the existence of immaterial being as established at the end of the 
Physics. Given this, it is not surprising to find him also arguing that 
the science that studies this first and immaterial being, because it 
also studies being in general, is distinct from and higher than 
physics. Hence, granted that in this particular case he reasons from 
the fact that immaterial being exists to the distinctive character of 
the science of that first entity and the science of ens commune, it 
need not follow that he could only proceed in this manner. It was 
only natural for him to do so here, because of the context, that is, 
the refutation of the early naturalists, and because of his ultimate 
purpose in the immediate context, to show that the study of first 
principles does not belong to them but to the science that studies being 
in general. Finally, Thomas is here interpreting the text of Aristotle. 
If in more independent texts one should find him suggesting a differ 
ent procedure, then greater weight should be given to those texts 
40 
Geiger, "Abstraction et s?paration," p. 25. See below for considera 
tion of such passages wherein Thomas recommends studying physics after 
metaphysics. 
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when it comes to a determination of Thomas's personal thought on 
the matter in question. This final suggestion will be developed below. 
Perhaps the most forceful text pointing toward the dependence 
of metaphysics and presumably, therefore, of separatio upon the 
conclusions of natural philosophy is to be found in Thomas's com 
mentary on the final lines of chapter 1 of book 6 of Aristotle's Meta 
physics (and in his commentary on the parallel passage in book ll).41 
Here Thomas follows Aristotle's text very closely and raises the ques 
tion to which Aristotle himself explicitly adverts. One might well 
wonder whether first philosophy is universal in that it studies being in 
general, or whether its consideration is rather directed to a particular 
genus and a particular nature (separate and immobile reality).42 The 
question, of course, arises naturally from earlier developments in 
book 4, chapters 1 and 2, and book 6, chapter 1 of Aristotle's Meta 
physics. Aristotle's own resolution of this same difficulty has caused 
considerable perplexity for his commentators, as is well known.43 
In commenting on the solution offered by Aristotle in book 6, 
Thomas repeats his text with slightest modification. If there is no 
other substance apart from those that exist according to nature and 
of which physics treats, then physics will be the first science. But if 
there is some immobile substance, this will be prior to natural sub 
41 See nn. 1169-70, commenting on Aristotle's Metaphysics 6, c. 1 
(1026a23-32); and nn. 2266-67, commenting on Metaphysics 11, c. 7 
(1064b6-14). 42 See n. 1169: "Tertio movetur quaedam quaestio circa praedeter 
minata: et primo movet earn, dicens, quod aliquis potest dubitare, utrum 
prima philosophia sit universalis quasi considerans ens universaliter, aut eius 
consideratio sit circa aliquod genus determinatum et naturam unam." For 
the parallel from his commentary on bk. 11, see n. 2266: ". . . et dicit: 
Dubitabile est, utrum istam scientiam, quae est circa entia separabilia, opor 
teat poni universalem scientiam entis, inquantum est ens, aut non. ..." 43 
See, for instance, the solutions proposed by J. Owens, The Doctrine 
of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1957); Ph. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, 
2d ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), chap. 7; A. Mansion, "L'objet de 
la science philosophique supr?me d'apr?s Aristote, M?taphysique E I," 
M?langes de philosophie grecque offerts ? Mgr. A. Di?s (Paris: J. Vrin, 
1956), pp. 151-68; "Philosophie premi?re, philosophie seconde, et m?ta 
physique chez Aristote," Revue philosophique de Louvain 56 (May 1958): 
165-221; P. Aubenque, Le probl?me de l'?tre chez Aristote. Essai sur la 
probl?matique Aristot?licienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1962); E. K?nig, "Aristoteles' erste Philosophie als universale Wissenschaft 
von den APXAI," Archiv f?r Geschichte der Philosophie 52 (1970): 225-46. 
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stance. Therefore, the philosophy that considers this kind of sub 
stance will be first philosophy. And because it is first it will therefore 
be universal. It will belong to it to study being as being, both what 
it is, and the attributes which pertain to being as being.44 And 
then, in a significant addition to Aristotle's text, Thomas concludes: 
for the science of the first being and the science of being in general 
are one and the same, as has been maintained in the beginning of book 
4.45 Thomas's commentary on the passage in book 11 parallels 
the above very closely. But there he offers a justification for the 
concluding statement which he had added to his commentary on book 
6. To prove that the science that studies the first being(s)#is the 
same as the universal science, he observes that the first beings are 
the principles of the others.46 
One might, therefore, well argue from Thomas's commentary 
on the passage from Metaphysics 6 (and the parallel text from 
Metaphysics 11) that metaphysics (and separatio as required to dis 
cover being as being) presupposes prior awareness that immaterial 
44 
n. 1170. Thomas's final sentence reads: "Et quia est prima, ideo erit 
universalis, et erit eius speculari de ente inquantum est ens, et de eo quod 
quid est, et de his quae sunt entis inquantum est ens; eadem enim est scientia 
primi entis et entis communis, ut in principio quarti habitum est." Compare 
with the Latin version printed in the Marietti text: "Et quia prima et de 
ente inquantum est ens, eius utique est speculari, et quod quid est, et quae 
insunt inquantum ens" (p. 294, n. 542). In both this text and in Thomas's 
paraphrase of the same, the expression "quia prima" ("because it is first") 
with which the preceding sentence concludes in the Greek text has rather 
been joined to the following sentence. For the Greek see 1026a29-32: 
ei 8'ecttl rt? ovcr?a ?/a^r/ro?, avTi) irpoTepa Kai <?>L\oorp(?)?a wpajTr}, 
Kai Ka0?\ov ovrc?c ?tl 7rpo)Trj' ko? irepl tov ?vtos r) bv, toutt)*; 
av eil) de(?p?)crai, Kal t? ?crn Ka? Ta vir?pxovTa r? bv. Also 
see Thomas, In 3 Met.: "Sicut si non essent aliae substantiae priores 
substantiis mobilibus corporalibus, scientia naturalis esset philosophia 
prima, ut dicitur infra in sexto" (n. 398). As Thomas himself indicates in this 
paragraph, this statement is to be read in the light of Aristotle's procedure 
in Metaphysics 4 and 6. 45 Ibid. For the text see n. 44 above. 
46 n. 2267. "Sed de naturali manifestum est; quia si naturales sub 
stantiae, quae sunt substantiae sensibiles et mobiles, sunt primae inter entia, 
oportet quod naturalis scientia sit prima inter scientias; quia secundum 
ordinem subiectorum, est ordo scientiarum, ut iam dictum est.?Si autem 
est alia natura et substantia praeter substantias naturales, quae sit separa 
bilis et immobilis, necesse est alteram scientiam ipsius esse, quae sit prior 
naturali. Et ex eo quod est prima, oportet quod sit universalis. Eadem 
enim est scientia quae est de primis entibus, et quae est universalis. Nam 
prima entia sunt principia aliorum" (italics mine). 
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and immobile being exists. Negatively expressed, Thomas has 
written that if there is no substance beyond the physical, then physics 
will be the first science. Positively phrased, he states that if there 
is some immobile substance, then the philosophy that studies this 
kind of substance will be first, and because it is first, it will also be 
universal and the science of being as being. Moreover, if one wonders 
how Aristotle himself justifies the transition from first philosopy to 
the universal science in this passage (see Metaphysics 6, 1026a30 ff.), 
Thomas has asserted the identity of the two in commenting on Meta 
physics 6. In commenting on Metaphysics 11, he has supplied an 
added.reason: the first being(s) are the principles of the others. The 
implication seems to be: in studying the first principle, one studies 
all else. In sum, therefore, if all being is physical, if there is no 
immaterial and immobile being in the positive sense, it seems that one 
could not reason that being, in order to be, need not be material. In 
short, one would not be justified in distinguishing being as such from 
being as material and changeable by means of separatio. Therefore, 
one would be unable to arrive at a science of being as being rather 
than a science of being as changing.47 It should also be noted that 
prior knowledge of immaterial and immobile beings appears to be 
required. In other words, prior knowledge of the existence of a 
spiritual human soul is not implied by these texts from Thomas's com 
mentary. Hence they offer little support for the view that one might 
ground separatio on this conclusion rather than on the existence of an 
immaterial and immobile being, viz., the First and Unmoved Mover. 
In attempting to evaluate the importance of this text and its 
parallel, two points should be recalled. (1) Thomas is here writing as a 
commentator on Aristotle and is following his text with greatest care. 
In fact, he presents this as Aristotle's answer to Aristotle's question. 
Can one automatically assume that this reflects Thomas's own 
opinion, unless further evidence can also be offered from other texts 
where Thomas is clearly expressing his personal views? One's 
hesitation in replying in the affirmative will, of course, increase if 
47 For such an interpretation of these passages see Moreno, "The Na 
ture of Metaphysics," pp. 113-15; T. O'Brien, Metaphysics and the Exist 
ence of God (Washington, D.C.: Thomist Press, 1960), p. 160 (citing In 
6 Met., n. 1170); J. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1972), p. 243, n. 1; p. 303, n. 1; J. Weisheipl, "The Relationship of 
Medieval Natural Philosophy to Modern Science: The Contribution of 
Thomas Aquinas to its Understanding," Manuscripta 20 (November 1976): 
194-96. 
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one finds Thomas suggesting a different procedure in such texts.48 (2) 
The concluding sentence, as has already been noted above, has 
been added by Aquinas and appeals to the identity of the science that 
studies the first being and the science that studies being in general, 
as established in the beginning of book 4. For the sake of con 
venience, these two points will now be considered in reverse order. 
As regards the second point, Thomas makes an interesting re 
mark in commenting on the opening chapter of Metaphysics 4. He 
observes that the Philosopher (Aristotle) is there attempting to show 
that the science under examination has ens for its subject. He notes 
that every principle is a per se principle and cause with respect to 
some nature. But in this science we seek after the first principles 
and ultimate causes of things, he continues, repeating Aristotle's 
text, and refers to book 1 of the Metaphysics for support for the 
same.49 Therefore, these first principles and ultimate causes must 
also be per se principles and causes of some nature. But that 
"nature" can only be ens. Following Aristotle, he writes that those 
philosophers who investigated the elements of things insofar as they 
are beings were seeking principles of this type (prima et altissima). 
Therefore, continues Thomas, in this science we must investigate the 
principles of being as being. And in an addition to Aristotle's text 
he concludes: "Therefore being [ens] is the subject of this science, 
because every science seeks after the proper causes of its subject."50 
In sum, therefore, Thomas here is surely stating his personal 
view, a view that he attributes to Aristotle as well, that is, that ens or 
being is the subject of this science. One can be certain that this is 
48 On the difficult point of determining whether Thomas in this com 
mentary is simply exposing Aristotle's thought as he understands it, or 
whether he is using the commentary as an occasio to express his personal 
metaphysical views, or whether he proceeds in one way at times and in the 
other at other times, see J. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics: A Historico 
doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics (The Hague: Mar 
tinus Nijhoff, 1972). For our review of the same see Speculum 52 (January 
1977): 133-35. For an examination of Thomas's role as commentator on 
Aristotle in general, but with special emphasis on the commentary on the 
Metaphysics, see J. Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," St. 
Thomas Aquinas 127^-197^: Commemorative Studies, 2 vols. (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 1: pp. 213-38. 49 See chaps. 1 and 2 and Thomas's commentary on the same. 
50In Jf Met., n. 533. See in particular: ". . . ergo ens est subiec 
tum huius scientiae, quia quaelibet scientia est quaerens causas proprias 
sui subiecti." 
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his personal opinion because of statements in other texts as well.51 
But if it is his view that being is the subject of metaphysics, and 
secondly that it is the business of a science to investigate the princi 
ples and causes of its subject, and finally that God (the First Un 
moved Mover) is such a principle, then it would seem strange for him 
to suggest that one must first prove the existence of the First Un 
moved Mover (or God) in physics before discovering the subject of 
this science (metaphysics).52 Yet such seems to be implied by his 
commentary on Metaphysics 6, chapter 1 and in the parallel passage in 
Metaphysics 11, as we have seen above. And such seems to be im 
plied by the more traditional insistence that, according to Aquinas, 
one must move from a demonstration of the First Mover in physics 
to the discovery of being as being or to separatio as required for meta 
physics. It would rather seem that Thomas should have one begin 
by discovering being as such or being in general (as achieved by a 
judgment of existence and by separation according to our interpreta 
tion), and then, as part of the business of metaphysics, reason to the 
existence of the cause or principle of ens commune, that is to say, 
God. If it is difficult to reconcile this procedure with the statements 
51 
See, for instance, the references given in our n. 11 above. 52 Note the concluding sentence of Thomas's commentary on the Phys 
ics: "Et sic termin?t Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus na 
turalibus, in primo principio totius naturae, qui est super omnia Deus bene 
dictus in saecula. Amen." ed. Maggiolo (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1954), n. 
1172. For a general discussion of the contested point as to whether in 
Thomas's view the First Mover of Physics 8 is, in fact, God, see A. Pegis, 
"St. Thomas and the Coherence of the Aristotelian Theology," Mediaeval 
Studies 35 (1973): 67-117. For reference to some who would deny this 
see p. 68 and n. 3. See especially J. Paulus, "La th?orie du Premier 
Moteur chez Aristote," Revue de philosophie n.s. 4 (May-June 1933): 259 
94 and 394-424; J. Owens, "Aquinas and the Proof from the 'Physics'," 
Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966): 119-50. Pegis himself strongly defends this 
identity. See, for instance, pp. 97 ff. Whether or not Thomas has in fact 
reasoned to the existence of God in his commentary on the Physics, and if so 
whether he has or has not introduced some surreptitious metaphysical 
reasoning into the argumentation is too far-reaching an issue for us to at 
tempt to resolve in this study. We will content ourselves with the observa 
tion that in his final sentence therein he does assert that Aristotle's first 
principle of the whole of nature, in which the Physics terminates, is God. 
And we would stress the point to which we have already partially adverted, 
that the difficult passages from Thomas's commentary on Metaphysics 6 
and 11 seem to require prior knowledge of immaterial, separate, and 
immobile being in order to justify metaphysics. Neither prior knowledge 
of the human soul nor of a sphere soul that moves itself without being 
absolutely unmoved and separate would appear to suffice. 
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found in his commentary on Metaphysics 6 and 11, it may be that in 
those texts he does not present his personal view, but his under 
standing of Aristotle's text. And it may be that on this particular 
point, the two do not coincide. This, of course, brings us back to the 
first point singled out above. 
For further clarification of this one is well advised to turn to the 
Prooemium to Thomas's commentary on the Metaphysics. Here, in 
any event, he is surely writing in his own name. Again he lists the 
same three titles for this science that we have seen in question 5, 
article 1 of his commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, that 
is: theology, metaphysics and first philosophy.53 
Here he has already reasoned that one of the sciences should 
direct or rule the others, and that it will therefore deserve to be 
entitled "wisdom." In an effort to determine which science this is, 
he writes that it will be the one that is most intellectual. But the most 
intellectual science is that which treats of that which is most in 
telligible. 
Things may be described as most intelligible from different 
perspectives, three of which Thomas here singles out. First of all, 
something may be regarded as most intelligible from the viewpoint of 
the order of understanding (ex ordine intelligendi). Those things 
from which the intellect derives certitude are more intelligible than 
others. Since such are the causes, a knowledge of causes appears to 
be most intellectual. Hence, from this standpoint the science that 
considers the first causes appears to be best qualified to direct the 
others. 
Secondly, things may be regarded as most intelligible from the 
standpoint of the relationship between sense and intellect. While 
sense knowledge has to do with particulars, intellectual knowledge is 
ordered to the universal. Therefore, that science is most intellectual 
which treats of the most universal principles, that is, of being and 
53 See the final paragraph of the prooemium: "Dicitur enim scientia 
divina sive theologia, inquantum praedictas substantias consid?r?t. Meta 
p%sica,inquantum consid?r?t ens et ea quae consequunturipsum . . . Dic 
itur autem prima philosophia, inquantum primas rerum causas consid?r?t." 
His reason for entitling this science "first philosophy" (because it considers 
the first causes of things) differs from that offered in his commentary on the 
De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1: "Dicitur etiam philosophia prima, in quantum aliae 
omnes scientiae ab ea sua principia accipientes earn consequuntur" (p. 166). 
For our effort to resolve this problem in Thomistic interpretation see the 
study cited in n. 11 above. 
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that which follows upon it such as the one and the many, potency 
and act. From this standpoint, therefore, the science of the universal, 
that is, the science of being, is the most intellectual and best qualified 
to rule or direct the others. 
Thirdly, something may be viewed as most intelligible from the 
standpoint of the conditions required for intellection to occur. Since 
a thing is capable of intellection to the degree that it is free from 
matter, and since the intellect and its object must be proportioned 
to one another, things that are most separate from matter are most 
intelligible. But those things are most separate or removed from 
matter which abstract from sensible matter altogether, not only in 
the order of thought but also in the order of being. As examples 
Thomas cites God and the intelligences. Therefore, from this per 
spective, the science that treats of God and the intelligences is the 
most intellectual and hence chief or mistress of the others.54 
Thomas then raises the obvious question. One might wonder 
whether or not these different kinds of intelligibles are to be investi 
gated by one and the same science. In his effort to show that this is 
the case he first observes that the above mentioned separate sub 
stances (see class three) are universal and primary causes of being 
(see class one). Moreover, he continues, it pertains to one and the 
same science to investigate the causes proper to a given genus and to 
investigate that genus itself. Thus the natural philosopher considers 
the principles of natural body. Therefore, it belongs to one and the 
same science to investigate both the separate substances and ens 
commune (see class two). This is so because ens commune is the 
"genus" of which the separate substances are common and universal 
causes.55 
In other terms, Thomas has distinguished three classes of intelli 
gible objects and has endeavored to show that while all three of these 
are studied by the science in question, only one of them, ens commune, 
54 For all of this see the prooemium, p. 1. 55 Haec autem triplex consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae at 
tribui d?bet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et 
primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas 
proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis consid?r?t principia 
corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat con 
siderare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt 
praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae" (prooemium, pp. 
1-2). 
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is its subject. As Thomas also indicates, the subject of a science is 
that whose causes and properties one investigates rather than those 
causes themselves. Knowledge of the causes is the end or goal toward 
which the science's investigation is directed.56 
Here, then, one has reinforcement for the view being proposed 
in this paper, the suggestion that one begins the science of meta 
physics with its subject, the notion of being in general already achieved 
by separatio, and then, as part of the business of metaphysics, one 
seeks for the cause or causes of that same genus, that is to say, God 
and separate substances. Rather than presuppose the existence of 
immaterial being in the positive sense (God and separate entities), 
such knowledge is here held out as the end or goal towards which 
the metaphysician's investigation strives. 
Finally, Thomas makes it clear here that not only immaterial be 
ing in the positive sense is at issue. Not only are those things said 
to be separate from matter secundum esse et rationem which are 
never found in matter, such as God and intellectual substances, but 
also those which can be without matter, such as ens commune.57 As 
he had noted in question 5, article 4 of his commentary on the De 
Trinitate of Boethius: 
. . . 
something can exist separate from matter and motion in two 
distinct ways: First, because by its nature the thing that is called sepa 
rate in no way can exist in matter and motion, as God and the angels 
are said to be separate from matter and motion. Second, because by 
56 
"Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria con 
sidered non tarnen consid?r?t quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum 
solum ens commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et 
passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam 
cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quern consideratio scientiae 
pertingit" (prooemium, p. 2). For the same view with respect to the rela 
tionship between a science, its subject-genus, and its principles, see the 
commentary on the De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 4, c. (192-95). There, too, 
Thomas notes that "divine things" are studied by the philosophers only inso 
far as they are the principles of all things. Hence they are treated in that 
discipline which studies that which is common to all beings and which has as 
its subject ens in quantum est ens (p. 194. 23-26). 57 
"Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur 
tarnen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. 
Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum ilia quae 
nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuals substantiae, 
sed etiam ilia quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune. Hoc 
tarnen non contingeret, si a materia secundum esse dependerent" (pro 
oemium, p. 2). 
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its nature it does not exist in matter and motion, but it can exist without 
them, though we sometimes find it with them.58 
It is clear that it is this second type of immateriality, negative or 
neutral immateriality, that applies to ens commune, the subject of 
metaphysics. As Thomas also comments in that same article from his 
commentary on the De Trinitate: 
. . . We say that being and substance are separate from matter and 
motion, not because it is of their nature to be without them . . . but 
because it is not of their nature to be in matter and motion, although 
sometimes they are in matter and motion . . ,59 
As we have indicated above, it is this kind of immateriality that is 
achieved by separatio. And in light of Thomas's discussion both in 
the body of question 5, article 4 of this same commentary and in the 
prooemium to his commentary on the Metaphysics, it does not seem 
that discovery of the same presupposes prior awareness that im 
material being in the positive or stronger sense actually exists. 
In the prooemium Thomas had appealed to the position of the 
natural philosopher in order to show that one and the same science 
may investigate the causes of its subject genus and that genus itself.60 
As regards Thomas's own attitude with respect to the science that has 
ens commune as its subject, one might develop the parallel he has 
suggested there as follows. As natural philosophy is to its subject 
and the causes of its subject, so is metaphysics to its subject and 
the causes of its subject. But natural philosophy does not presuppose 
58 Maurer trans., p. 45. For the Latin see the Decker ed., p. 195. 
12-18: ". . . secundum quod dupliciter potest esse aliquid a materia 
et motu separatum secundum esse. Uno modo sic, quod de ratione 
ipsius rei, quae separata dicitur, sit quod nullo modo in materia et motu esse 
possit, sicut Deus et angeli dicuntur a materia et motu separati. Alio modo 
sic, quod non sit de ratione eius quod sit in materia et motu, sed possit esse 
sine materia et motu, quamvis quandoque inveniatur in materia et motu." 
As Thomas goes on to observe in the immediate context, it is in this second 
way that being (ens), substance, and potency and act are separate. 59 
q. 5, a. 4 and 5 (Maurer trans., pp. 48-49). For the Latin see the 
Decker ed., p. 199. 4-9: "Ad quintum dicendum quod ens et substantia dicun 
tur separata a materia et motu non per hoc quod de ratione ipsorum sit esse 
sine materia et motu, sicut de ratione asini est sine ratione esse, sed per hoc 
quod de ratione eorum non est esse in materia et motu, quamvis quandoque 
sint in materia et motu, sicut animal abstrahit a ratione, quamvis aliquod 
sit rationale." This text and the one cited in the previous note bring out 
quite well what we have styled the negative or neutral immateriality of the 
notion of being. 60 See the text cited in n. 55 above. 
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the existence of the cause of its subject, but reasons to the same. 
Therefore, metaphysics does not presuppose the existence of the 
cause(s) of its subject (God and/or separate entity), but reasons to the 
same. If, as at times appears to be the case, Thomas has identified 
the First Mover of Physics 8 with God, then he could hardly make 
prior knowledge of the existence of this First Mover a necessary pre 
supposition for beginning metaphysics.61 To do so would be to have 
the metaphysician presuppose prior knowledge of the existence of the 
cause of the subject of his science. But knowledge of this cause has 
been proposed as the end or goal of the metaphysician's investigation. 
On the other hand, one might meet the above contention by 
suggesting that Thomas has distinguished between the First Mover of 
the Physics (an immanent and self-moving principle of change) and 
the First Principle of the Metaphysics (an absolutely immobile and 
separate cause of being, or God).62 Then one might argue that accord 
ing to Thomas prior knowledge of this First Mover as established in 
physics is required if one is to discover being as being. Still, this 
suggestion will not do. If one insists that according to Thomas one 
must reason from the fact that immaterial, immobile, and separate 
61 See n. 52 above for the concluding sentence of Thomas's commen 
tary on the Physics and for the studies by Pegis as well as those by Owens 
and Paulus. 
62 As noted by Owens and Pegis, Summa contra gentiles 1. 13 is par 
ticularly difficult to interpret on this point. One paragraph might well be 
taken to imply that Thomas here distinguishes between the primary immo 
bile mover as a sphere soul established by Aristotle in Physics 8 and the 
God who is proven in Metaphysics 12: "Sed quia Deus non est pars alicuius 
moventis seipsum, ulterius Aristoteles, in sua Metaphysica, investigat ex 
hoc motore qui est pars moventis seipsum, alium motorem separatum om 
nino, qui est Deus" (see in his discussion of the "secunda via," the par. "sed 
quia"). For Owens's discussion of this see his "Aquinas and the Proof from 
the 
'Physics'," pp. 132-37. Note in particular his concluding comment with 
respect to the treatment in SCG 1. 13: "Here in the same chapter the inter 
pretations of the argument as leading in the Physics to a sphere soul and to 
God occur side by side, without any feeling of embarrassment being shown by 
the writer" (p. 137). For a different interpretation of the same see Pegis, 
"St. Thomas and the Coherence of the Aristotelian Theology," pp. 78-86; 
108-12. As already noted above (see n. 52), Pegis maintains that for 
Thomas, in proving the existence of the prime mover in the Physics Aristotle 
was proving the existence of God. Owens, on the other hand, finds no defi 
nite indication that Thomas himself thought that a demonstration on the level 
of natural philosophy can prove God's existence (p. 149). For his view that 
the "first way" of ST 1, q. 2, a. 3 is metaphysical rather than pertaining 
to the philosophy of nature see his "The Conclusion of the Prima Via," 
Modern Schoolman 30 (January 1953): 109-21. 
460 JOHN F. WIPPEL 
being exists (as implied by the commentary on Metaphysics 6 and 
11) in order to justify separatio, appeal to an immanent self-moving 
mover will not suffice.63 If one must reason from the fact that immate 
rial, immobile, and separate being exists to the possibility of consider 
ing being as being rather than as material, changeable, and immanent, 
appeal to such an immanent mover will be of little avail. 
Before concluding this historical investigation, it is incumbent 
upon us to consider one final point. There can be little doubt that 
Thomas frequently enough recommends that one move from a study of 
physics to metaphysics when he discusses the order of learning. This 
fact might be raised against the interpretation just proposed and in 
support of the claim that for Aquinas both separatio and the very pos 
sibility of metaphysics presuppose the conclusions of Physics. Al 
though limitations of space will not permit detailed consideration of 
each of these passages, some general remarks are in order. In the 
interests of simplification, one might divide these texts into two gen 
eral categories: 1) those based on the incapacity of the learner, when 
too young, to learn metaphysics; 2) those treating of the relationship 
between metaphysics and other intellectual disciplines, especially 
physics (natural philosophy).64 
One of the finest illustrations of the first is to be found in Thomas's 
commentary on book 6 of Aristotle's Ethics. Aristotle's query as 
to why a boy may become a mathematician but not a wise man or a 
philosopher of nature serves as the occasion for Thomas's reflections.65 
Thomas takes the term "wise man" to refer to a metaphysician. He 
begins by expanding on Aristotle's reply. Mathematicals are grasped 
by abstraction from sensible things of which even a boy (puer) has 
awareness. But natural principles are not simply abstracted from 
sensible things but are acquired by experience, for which considerable 
time is required. As regards wisdom, continues Thomas, Aristotle 
63 Thomas's texts from his commentary on Metaphysics 6 and 11 
do imply that if there were no immaterial, immutable, and separate entity, 
physics would be first philosophy (see nn. 1163,1164,1169,1170, 2266, 2267). 
Hence, if this does indeed reflect Thomas's personal view rather than his 
interpretation of Aristotle, knowledge of an immanent and self-moving prin 
ciple of change, that is, a sphere soul, will be no more adequate than knowl 
edge of the human soul. 64 On this see G. Klubertanz, "St. Thomas on Learning Metaphysics," 
Gregorianum 35 (1954): 3-17. Also see his "The Teaching of Thomistic 
Metaphysics," Gregorianum 35 (1954): 187-205. 65 For Aristotle see Ethics 6. 8. 1142al6 ff. 
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observes that young men (iuvenes)66 do not attain metaphysical truths 
with their minds even though they may verbally utter them. In sup 
port of this Thomas also comments that mathematical definitions 
(rationes) pertain to things that can be imagined, whereas those of 
wisdom (metaphysics) are purely intelligible. If young men (iuvenes) 
can grasp that which is imaginable, they find it difficult to attain that 
which exceeds this level.67 
With this background in mind, then, Thomas proposes the fol 
lowing order for learning. Boys (pueri) should first be instructed in 
logic, and then in mathematics. They should then study natural things 
(natural philosophy presumably). For while natural things do not 
transcend the level of sense and imagination, knowledge of them 
does require experience. Then only should they be introduced to 
moral science, and last of all, to wisdom and the study of divine 
things which transcend the imagination and require a powerful intel 
lect.68 One finds a similar progression of disciplines reported by 
Thomas in his commentary on the Liber de causis.69 But in both of 
66 On the meanings to be assigned to the terms puer and iuvenis in 
Thomas's usage see Klubertanz, "St. Thomas on Learning Metaphysics," 
pp. 5-8. 67 In 6 Ethic, 1. 7 (Spiazzi ed., [Turin: Marietti, 1964] nn. 1209 
10). Note in particular: "Iuvenes autem de facili capere possunt ea quae 
sub imaginatione cadunt. Sed ad ilia quae excedunt sensum et imagina 
tionem non attingunt mente, quia nondum habent intellectum exercitatum ad 
tales considerationes, turn propter parvitatem temporis, turn propter pluri 
mas mutationes naturae." 
68 
Ibid., n. 1211. "Erit ergo congruus ordo addiscendi ut primo 
quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia l?gica docet modum totius philo 
sophiae. Secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis quae nee experi 
entia indigent, nee imaginationem transcendunt. Tertio autem in naturali 
bus; quae etsi non excedunt sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tarnen 
experientiam. Quarto in moralibus quae requirunt experientiam et animum 
a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est. Quinto autem in sapientiali 
bus et divinis quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intel 
lectum." That this text does reflect Thomas's own view and not merely his 
interpretation of Aristotle's thought is indicated both by the fact that it is an 
addition to the text being commented on and by comparison with Thomas's 
correlation of sense, imagination, and intellect with physics, mathematics, 
and divine science in terms of their respective levels of termination in his 
commentary on the De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2, pass. 69 Here Thomas presents the same learning order as that which the phi 
losophers themselves had followed: "Et inde est quod philosophorum in 
tentio ad hoc principaliter erat ut, per omnia quae in rebus considerabant, 
ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirent. Unde scientiam de primis 
causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae 
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these texts the concern appears to be pedagogical, that is to say, with 
the gradually developing capacities of the learning subject. There is 
no indication that one should study metaphysics after natural philoso 
phy because the former depends upon the latter for knowledge of its 
starting point. Hence texts such as these surely do not point to an 
essential or intrinsic dependency of metaphysics upon the conclusions 
of physics, and especially not with respect to discovery of the subject 
of metaphysics, being as being as attained by separatio. 
Other texts treat of the relationship that obtains between meta 
physics, on the one hand, and other disciplines, especially natural 
philosophy, on the other. One of the fullest is to be found in question 
5, article 1 of Thomas's commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, 
hence in that same work wherein he was to develop and present his 
views on separatio. There, in replying to the ninth objection, he 
writes: 
Although divine science is by nature the first of all the sciences, with 
respect to us the other sciences come before it. For, as Avicenna says, 
the position of this science is that it be learned after the natural sci 
ences, which explain many things used by metaphysics, such as gen 
eration, corruption, motion, and the like. It should also be learned 
after mathematics, because to know the separate substances meta 
physics has to know the number and dispositions of the heavenly 
spheres and this is impossible without astronomy, which presupposes 
the whole of mathematics. Other sciences, such as music, ethics, and 
the like, contribute to its fullness of perfection.70 
deputarent: primo quidem incipientes a l?gica quae modum scientiarum tra 
dit, secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse 
capaces, tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam tem 
pore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse 
conveniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant 
quae consid?r?t primas entium causas." Sancti Thomae de Aquini super 
Libfum de causis expositio, ?d. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg: Soci?t? Philoso 
phique-Louvain, E. Nauwelaerts, 1954), p. 2. For an interesting discussion 
as to how Thomas would apply the order recommended by the text cited in 
n. 68 above to medieval pre-theological students, see Klubertanz, "St. 
Thomas on Learning Metaphysics," pp. 14-16. Klubertanz (p. 5, n. 3) lists 
some other texts on the difficulty of learning metaphysics or which assign 
it to last place. Of these see In Isaiam, c. 3; SCG 1. 4; In 1 Met., 1. 2, 
n. 46. 
70 Maurer trans., pp. 16-17. For the Latin see Decker ed., 
172. 3-11: ". . . quamvis scientia divina sit prima omnium scientiarum 
naturaliter, tarnen quoad nos aliae scientiae sunt priores. Ut enim dicit 
Avicenna in principio suae Metaphysicae, ordo huius scientiae est, ut addis 
catur post scientias naturales, in quibus sunt multa determinata, quibus 
ista scientia utitur, ut generatio, corruptio, motus et alia huiusmodi. Simi 
liter etiam post mathematicas. Indiget enim haec scientia ad cognitionem 
substantiarum separatarum cognoscere numerum et ordines orbium caeles 
tium, quod non est possibile sine astrologia, ad quam tota mathematica prae 
exigitur. Aliae vero scientiae sunt ad bene esse ipsius, ut m?sica et morales 
vel aliae huiusmodi." 
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In another context we have had occasion to comment on this passage 
and the immediately following lines in some detail and to stress the 
heavy usage of Avicenna therein.71 Even so, we find no reason to 
deny that this text does represent Thomas's personal view. Accord 
ing to this text, therefore, divine science (metaphysics) is to be learned 
after the other sciences, though it is by nature first of all the sciences. 
Following Avicenna's lead, Thomas notes that it is to be learned after 
the natural sciences in which various things are determined which 
this science uses. Avicenna had listed the following illustrations: 
generation, corruption, alteration, place and time, the axiom that 
whatever is moved is moved by another, and an indication of those 
things which are moved with respect to the first mover.72 Thomas 
has abbreviated Avicenna's listing and omitted therefrom explicit 
reference to alteration, place and time, the axiom of motion, and the 
first mover. After citing generation and corruption he simply men 
tions motion and other things of this kind. For our immediate pur 
poses it is important to note that Thomas does not say that meta 
physics derives knowledge of its subject matter and/or justifies sepa 
ratio by relying on the philosopher of nature.73 
Thomas has also indicated that metaphysics should be studied 
after mathematics. A knowledge of astronomy and hence of mathe 
matics is required to enable one to arrive at knowledge of the number 
and of the order of the separate substances and therefore of the heav 
enly spheres. Again there is no indication that metaphysics depends 
on mathematics for knowledge of its starting point, being as being, or 
71 
"Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna on the Relationship between First 
Philosophy and the Other Theoretical Sciences: A Note on Thomas's Com 
mentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 9," Thomist 37 (January 
1973): 133-54. 
72 For Avicenna see his Metaphysica 1, c. 3 (Venice, 1508, reprod. 
Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1961), fol. 71Rb-71Va: "Ordo vero huius sci 
entiae est ut discatur post scientias naturales et discipl?nales. Sed post 
naturales, ideo, quia multa de his quae conceduntur in ista sunt de Ulis quae 
iam probata sunt in naturali sicut generatio et corruptio, et alteritas, et locus, 
et tempus, et quod omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, et quae sunt ea 
quae moventur ad primum motorem, etc. Post discipl?nales vero, ideo quia 
intentio ultima in hac scientia est cognitio gubernatoris Dei altissimi, et 
cognitio angelorum spiritualium et ordinum suorum, et cognitio ordinationis 
in comparatione circulorum, ad quam scientiam impossibile est perveniri 
nisi per cognitionem Astrologiae. Ad scientiam vero Astrologiae nemo po 
test pervenire nisi per scientiam Arithmeticae et Geometriae." 73 Hence the appropriateness of Klubertanz's remark: "This text is as 
interesting for what it does not say as for what it says ... St. Thomas does 
not say that metaphysics receives its object from the philosophy of nature" 
(op. cit., p. 10). 
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in order to justify separatio. Thomas's remarks about music, ethics, 
and the like obviously do not point to formal or intrinsic dependence 
of metaphysics upon these disciplines. 
Then, in continuing dependency upon Avicenna, Thomas refutes 
the charge of circularity that might seem to follow from admitting that 
metaphysics both proves the principles of the other sciences and yet 
borrows some points from them. In his discussion of this he concen 
trates on the relationship between metaphysics and natural science. 
No vicious circle is involved because the principles which natural 
science receives from first philosophy are not used to prove those 
points which the first philosopher receives from the natural philoso 
pher. Rather the latter (those points which the first philosopher 
takes from the natural philosopher) are proved by means of other 
self-evident principles. Moreover, the principles which the first phi 
losopher gives to natural philosophy are not proved by means of 
principles borrowed therefrom, but by means of other self-evident 
principles.74 Again, there is no indication in this text that first phi 
losophy derives its starting point or subject from natural philosophy, 
or that separatio depends upon natural philosophy's proof of a First 
Mover. Indeed, if such were implied by this text, then one might well 
wonder whether or not the charge of a vicious circle had been evaded. 
One would have to show that the argument for the First Mover in 
physics did not itself employ principles derived from and proven in 
metaphysics and therefore dependent on prior knowledge of being in 
general or the subject of metaphysics. 
In what appears to be another refutation of the charge of circu 
larity, Thomas then introduces some further precisions: 
Moreover, the sensible effects on which the demonstrations of natural 
science are based are more evident to us in the beginning. But when 
we come to know the first causes through them, these causes will 
reveal to us the reason for the effects, from which they were proved 
by a demonstration quia. In this way natural science also contributes 
something to divine science, and nevertheless it is divine science that 
explains its principles. That is why Boethius places divine science 
last, because it is last relative to us.75 
74 Decker ed., p. 172. 13-20. For discussion of two different 
ways in which this passage might be interpreted and for fuller justification 
of the reading followed here see our "Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna," 
pp. 142-46. 75 
Ibid., p. 172. 21-173. 4: "Praetera, effectus sensibiles, ex quibus 
procedunt demonstrationes naturales, sunt notiores quoad nos in principio, 
sed cum per eos pervenerimus ad cognitionem causarum primarum, ex eis 
apparebit nobis propter quid illorum effectuum, ex quibus probabantur dem 
onstratione quia. Et sic et scientia naturalis aliquid tradit scientiae divinae, 
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Here Thomas reasons that the demonstrations of natural science are 
based on sensible effects, and that such effects are more evident to 
us in the beginning. He suggests that one can reason to knowledge 
of the "first causes" by means of these effects and that, having done 
so, knowledge of such causes will reveal the reason for the effects. 
Thus natural science contributes something to divine science, and at 
the same time the former's principles are explained by the latter. 
One might wonder what it is that natural science contributes 
to divine science, merely some knowledge of the sensible effects on 
which its (divine science's) demonstrations are based, or also the dis 
covery of the first cause by means of these effects.76 It seems that the 
text could be interpreted either way. If natural science only con 
tributes knowledge of those sensible effects which are then used by 
the metaphysician in his reasoning to the existence of first causes, 
there would be no evidence in this passage for thinking that Thomas 
would ground the starting point of metaphysics on natural philoso 
phy's demonstration of the First Mover. But if the demonstration 
quia or discovery of first causes is itself assigned to natural philosophy 
et tarnen per earn sua principia notificantur. Et inde est quod Boethius ul 
timo ponit scientiam divinam, quia est ultima quoad nos." Maurer trans., 
pp. 17-18. 76 As Owens has pointed out, the text states that it is through these 
sensible effects that one reaches knowledge of the first causes. "The text 
does not say that the first causes are reached by the demonstrations of natural 
philosophy." See his "Aquinas and the Prooffrom the 'Physics'," p. 131. 
According to Owens: "In Aristotle, the separate substances are reached 
in metaphysics, in a process of reasoning that takes its starting point 
from the demonstrations of the eternity of the cosmic motion in natural 
philosophy." In this peripatetic setting, natural philosophy would be 
of necessary help to metaphysics. But Thomas here uses the "neutral 
phrasing of'first causes' instead of'separate substances'," and hence can view 
the argumentation from sensible effects both as leading to first causes and 
as permitting natural philosophy to contribute something to metaphysics 
(pp. 131-32). Owens's interpretation, if correct, would square nicely 
with the view that we have found elsewhere in Aquinas, that it is the business 
of metaphysics by metaphysical reasoning to establish the existence of the 
cause(s) or principle(s) of its subject. Still, one might take this text as im 
plying that one may reason from sensible effects to a knowledge of first 
causes in natural philosophy itself. For this reading see our "Thomas 
Aquinas and Avicenna," p. 147. Viewed in itself, the text appears to be 
open to either interpretation. If one assumes that by "first causes" in this 
discussion Thomas has in mind God, then of course the issue touched on above 
reappears, that is, whether the First Mover established in natural philosophy 
is to be identified, in Thomas's eyes, with the Unmoved Mover of the Meta 
physics (God). Without attempting to resolve that issue, however, it seems 
to us that neither interpretation of this passage forces one to conclude that 
Thomas would require a physical demonstration of the First Mover in order 
for one to begin metaphysics. 
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by this text, some doubt might remain. Still, even if one interprets 
it in this way, there is no indication here that metaphysics depends 
on natural philosophy's demonstration of a First Mover in order to be 
gin its own investigations and, therefore, in order to establish its 
starting point, being as being. Hence, according to neither reading 
should this text be so construed. At most it might imply that in 
addition to receiving some help from natural philosophy with respect 
to the items Thomas had earlier itemized, metaphysics might benefit 
from the latter when it comes to scientia quia with respect to knowl 
edge of the existence of (the) first cause(s). If one interprets it in the 
first way indicated above, not even this implication will follow from 
this passage. In sum, therefore, Thomas's reply to the ninth objec 
tion does not imply that metaphysics must receive its subject matter 
from natural philosophy or that the demonstration of the First Mover 
by the latter is a necessary condition for the metaphysician to discover 
being as being or for separatio.77 
It is true that in discussing the reasons for entitling this science 
"metaphysics" Thomas writes that it comes "to us after physics among 
subjects to be learned; for we have to proceed from sensible things to 
77 Klubertanz distinguishes between the part of metaphysics that deals 
with being and its immediate principles, and that part which treats of God. 
"With the possible exception of one point (that there are distinct kinds of 
change), the philosophy of nature is not a necessary presupposition" for the 
first part. But some conclusions of the philosophy of nature are "necessarily 
presupposed" for the second part. He cites the points listed by Avicenna 
and suggests that they are necessary for establishing certain "negative 
attributes of spiritual substances, such as the immutability, immensity, and 
eternity of God" (p. 13). For knowledge of separate substances he also 
suggests that Thomas would presuppose knowledge of the human in 
tellect and cites In 1 De anima, 1. 1 (Pirotta ed. [Turin: Marietti, 1959] 
n. 7): "Quia si ad Philosophiam primam attendamus, non possumus devenire 
in cognitionem divinarum et altissimarum causarum, nisi per ea quae ex vir 
tute intellectus possibilis acquirimus. Si enim natura intellectus possibilis 
esset nobis ignota, non possemus scire ordinem substantiarum separatarum, 
sicut dicit Commentator super und?cimo Metaphysicae." While acknowl 
edging that there are Aristotelian physical arguments in support of the 
axiom of motion and with respect to the things immediately moved by the 
First Mover (see Avicenna's list of physics' contributions to metaphysics), 
there are also metaphysical arguments for the same. It is to the metaphysi 
cal argumentation that Thomas turns, continues Klubertanz, except when he 
is 
"expounding the Physics" (p. 13). The fact that Thomas did not list these 
particular items in his abbreviation of Avicenna makes us wonder if he would 
indeed agree that metaphysics must borrow them from physics. But we are 
in fullest agreement with Klubertanz's contention that Thomas does not base 
his metaphysics on the philosophy of nature (p. 17). To determine 
Thomas's mind on this point is, of course, a major purpose of the present 
study. 
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those that are not sensible" (commentary on the De Trinitate of 
Boethius, question 5, article l).78 In question 6, article 1 of this 
same work he observes that this science is learned after physics 
and the other sciences because intellectual consideration is the 
terminus of rational consideration. Hence it is called 
"metaphysics" 
or trans physicam because it comes after physics according to the 
process of analysis (resolutio).79 This reference to analysis or resolu 
tion reappears in the prooemium to his commentary on the Meta 
physics. Here he writes that this science is called "metaphysics" 
because it considers being and its properties; for these transphysicals 
are discovered by the process of resolution just as the more uni 
versal is discovered after the less universal.80 
But it should also be noted that in question 5, article 1 of the 
commentary on the De Trinitate he refers to it as "first philosophy" 
insofar as the other sciences, deriving their principles from it, follow 
after it.81 Again in question 6, article 1 of this same work, he names 
it first philosophy for this same reason and, insofar as according to 
the process of composition or synthesis, intellectual consideration 
(which he has there associated especially with this science) is the 
"principle" of rational consideration (which he has associated with 
natural philosophy).82 These discussions obviously involve the 
difficult issue to which Thomas addressed himself in replying to the 
ninth objection of question 5, article 1 of the De Trinitate, that is, 
the different ways in which metaphysics can derive certain points 
from the other sciences and still contribute principles to the same. 
The distinction between resolution (analysis) and composition (syn 
thesis) is also of importance with respect to that issue. But these 
passages do not state or imply that metaphysics must receive 
knowledge of the existence of the First or Unmoved Mover from 
physics so as to be able to discover its own subject, being as 
being, by means of separatio ,83 
78 Maurer trans., pp. 8-9. See the Decker ed., p. 166. 2-4: "quae 
alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam 
discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia de ve 
nire." 
79 Decker ed., p. 212. 22-25. 80 
"Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis 
communia post minus communia" (p. 2). 81 Decker ed., p. 166. 4-6. 82 
Ibid., p. 212. 20-22. 83 For discussion of the different reasons offered by Thomas for enti 
tling this science "first philosophy" in the commentary on the De Trinitate, 
on the one hand, and in the commentary on the Metaphysics, on the other, 
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In sum, therefore, in Thomas's mind there were strong pedagogi 
cal indications suggesting that metaphysics be studied after physics. 
As regards the order of learning, one should move from the easier to 
the more difficult, from the more concrete to the more abstract, from 
the more particular to the more universal. Moreover, certain points 
developed by physics might be of value to particular areas of meta 
physical investigation. Nonetheless, with the exception of the difficult 
texts drawn from his commentary on Metaphysics 6 and 11 and ana 
lyzed above, we have not found Thomas stating or implying that one 
must presuppose the existence of positively immaterial being in order 
to begin metaphysics. On the contrary, we have found such a sugges 
tion countered by his own view that it is the business of metaphysics 
to reason to the existence of the principles of its subject. Far from 
presupposing the existence of an Unmoved Mover or of God as given 
to it by physics, his personal view rather is that it is the task and 
goal of metaphysics to establish the same. Hence we have concluded 
that it is historically defensible to suggest that for Aquinas the pos 
sibility of metaphysics and, therefore, the possibility of separatio 
need not rest on a prior demonstration of a First Mover or Unmoved 
Mover in physics. Those texts just referred to from his commentary 
on Metaphysics 6 and 11 that point to the opposite should, therefore, 
in our opinion, be viewed as his interpretation of Aristotle's text but 
not as his personal view. 
Ill 
If the above is an historically defensible interpretation of Thomas's 
personal thought on separatio and the subject of metaphysics, another 
and more speculative issue remains. Within the framework of his 
metaphysical perspective is it possible for one to make a grounded 
judgment of separation, to distinguish that by reason of which some 
thing is described as being from that by reason of which it is described 
as being of a given kind, without presupposing prior awareness that 
positively immaterial being exists in fact? 
In considering this issue, certain points should be recalled. First 
of all, one is interested in arriving at a notion of being as being that 
might serve as subject of a science of being as being rather than at a 
notion of being that is restricted to the material and changeable. Sec 
ondly, according to Thomas himself, it is quite possible for one to study 
and his use of the distinction between resolution and composition with respect 
to the same see n. 53 above and our study cited there and in n. 11. 
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material being in metaphysics, not insofar as it is subject to change, 
but insofar as it is being.84 Thirdly, when giving what one may regard 
as illustrations of separatio, Thomas at times implies that things dis 
covered thereby are without matter and motion. At other times he 
writes that they can be without matter and motion.85 It is our con 
tention that awareness of the latter (the negatively immaterial) is suf 
ficient for him to arrive at a metaphysical notion of being, a notion that 
will serve as subject of the science in question. Finally, we have 
contended above that recourse to prior knowledge of the existence of a 
spiritual human soul, or even of a besouled first mover of the universe 
will not of itself be sufficient to prove that being, in order to be such, 
need not be material and changing. In short, if one can only justify 
separation by moving from prior awareness that the kind of being 
pointed to by this judgment does in fact exist, appeal to spiritual but 
changing being will not, of itself, prove that being, in order to be 
such, need not be changing. 
Given these considerations, then, we would invite the reader to 
reflect upon the distinctive intelligibilities implied by two different 
kinds of questions that may be raised. One question searches for that 
by reason of which something may be recognized as being or as real. 
Another searches for that by reason of which something is recognized 
as a given kind of being. If one is justified in distinguishing these 
two questions and therefore these two intelligibilities from one an 
other, one should then be in position to make this judgment: that by 
reason of which something is recognized as being need not be identified 
with or restricted to that by reason of which it is recognized as being 
of a given kind. (In fact, to deny this would be to deny that there 
can be different kinds of being, a conclusion that runs counter to our 
experience of different kinds of being, for instance, non-living beings, 
living beings, canine beings, human beings, etc.) But to be recog 
nized as material and changing is to be recognized as enjoying a given 
84 See In 6 Met., n. 1165: "Advertendum est autem, quod licet ad con 
siderationem primae philosophiae pertineant ea quae sunt separata secun 
dum esse et rationem a materia et motu, non tarnen solum ea; sed etiam de 
sensibilibus, inquantum sunt entia, Philosophus perscrutatur. Nisi forte 
dicamus, ut Avicenna dicit, quod huiusmodi communia de quibus haec sci 
entia perscrutatur, dicuntur separata secundum esse, non quia semper sint 
sine materia; sed quia non de necessitate habent esse in materia, sicut mathe 
matica." 
85 See the texts cited from q. 5, a. 3 of the commentary on the De 
Trinitate cited above in nn. 22, 28, and 29; and from q. 5, a. 4 of the same 
work, as cited in nn. 58 and 59. 
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kind of being. Therefore, being, in order to be recognized as such, 
need not be recognized as material and changing. Here, then, one 
has formulated a negative judgment or separatio, and one should now 
be in position to study being simply as being rather than as non-living 
or living or canine or human or as material and changing. The fact 
that one can, according to Thomas, study any kind of being, including 
material being, in metaphysics suggests that this procedure is not at 
odds with his understanding of the conditions required to ground the 
science in question. 
In light of this negative judgment, therefore, it would seem that 
in order for being to be realized as such, it need not be realized as 
material and changing. If, then, in the subsequent course of one's 
metaphysical investigations, one concludes to the existence of an 
immaterial and/or unchanging being, then one will be justified in 
predicating, albeit analogically, one's notion of being of it, a notion 
already grasped by means of the judgment of separation and presup 
posing an initial discovery of being based on a positive judgment of 
existence. According to this view, then, the notion of being that is 
achieved by separation need not presuppose previous knowledge of 
the existence of the human soul or of the First Mover of the Physics 
and/or of God. This notion is transcendental in this sense that it has 
been freed from restriction to any given kind of being, including the 
material and changeable.86 
The Catholic University of America. 
86 Most if not all of the authors cited above who find Aquinas grounding 
the very possibility of metaphysics and of separatio on prior knowledge that 
positively immaterial being exists would, of course, differ with our position. 
On the other hand, Klubertanz appears to go to the opposite extreme: 
"Hence, it is illusory to attempt to base a knowledge of being as being on the 
demonstrated existence of immaterial things. Either 'is' is freed from its 
sensible and changing context (prior to the proof of the existence of immate 
rial being, and thus is meaningful when we conclude to the existence of such 
being) or 'is' remains as we first find it immersed in sensibility and change. In 
the latter case, 'is' means 'is sensible, material and changeable', and to assert 
that 'An immaterial, immobile thing is sensible, material and changeable' 
is a contradiction" (Introduction to The Philosophy of Being, p. 52, n. 28). 
In our opinion it may be possible for one to reason from knowledge of the 
existence of positively immaterial and immobile being to the discovery of be 
ing as being (against Klubertanz), but this is not the only way of discovering 
being as being (in agreement with Klubertanz here and against the more 
traditional view). 
